These comments also consider whether the office should be placed in the Department of Commerce, as the greenpaper recommends, or else in the Executive Office of the President, which housed the office of the chief counselor for privacy under President Clinton. I conclude that the important thing is to ensure an ongoing privacy policy capability in the executive branch, while a good case can be made for housing it either in the Commerce Department or the Executive Office of the President. The vital work in that period of the Department of Commerce has been less fully discussed.
Background on privacy and the department of commerce
1 In 1997, Secretary Daley personally hosted a major conference and report on "Privacy and Self-Regulation in the Information Age. " That conference engaged many of the persons, and developed many of the concepts, that shaped U.S. privacy policy in the following years.
2 The department then led the complex and ongoing negotiations with the European Union about how to reconcile the E.U. Data Protection Directive and U.S. law, culminating in the Safe Harbor agreement in 2000, which is still in effect today. For the Safe Harbor and in numerous other privacy issues, the department, including its International Trade Administration, brought expertise to bear on topics such as e-commerce, international trade, and how privacy fits into broader business practices.
In the summer of 1998, Vice President Al Gore announced that a privacy policy position would be created in the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. As discussed further below, I entered the role of chief counselor for privacy in early For reasons set forth below, I generally support this recommendation, but with greater emphasis on certain functions the office can play, especially as an ongoing source of institutional expertise on privacy and in order to facilitate the interagency clearance of privacy-related issues.
A complementary role for a privacy office in Commerce: The importance of clearance and international privacy issues
To assess the potential usefulness of the PPO, it helps to first understand some important roles played by the Federal Trade Commission in privacy protection:
1. Enforcement. The FTC has the power to bring enforcement actions against "unfair and deceptive trade practices," and has negotiated consent decrees on privacy with both large and small companies.
Rulemaking.
In specific areas, such as children's online privacy and antispam measures, the FTC has explicit authority to issue rules under the Administrative Procedure Act. More broadly, the FTC could write rules under the more burdensome procedures created by the Magnuson-Moss Act, but it has not chosen to do so on privacy.
3. Convener. The FTC has brought together stakeholders in a variety of ways to discuss emerging online privacy issues, and in some instances catalyze industry self-regulatory codes of conduct.
4. Institutional expertise. Leading members of today's FTC efforts were also active during the privacy debates of the 1990's. The continuity of FTC staff has contributed to the commission's institutional expertise on privacy issues.
Bully pulpit.
Top FTC officials and staff direct the attention of companies toward emerging privacy issues.
The Commerce Department has at least two distinctive roles that complement this list of FTC privacy functions: clearance and ability to speak internationally for the administration.
The role of "clearance" is particularly important yet often little understood. In a 2000 document prepared for publication in the Stanford Law Review but not actually published, I went into some detail on the subject. To ensure a unified administration position, for congressional testimony, executive orders, and many other documents, drafts of documents are circulated among the various agencies and components of the Executive Office of the President. Once comments are received, discussions are sometimes needed to resolve differences of opinion, with appeal to more senior officials if differences are not resolved at lower levels. In addition to these structured clearance procedures, agency experts on an issue such as privacy often get engaged earlier in the policy planning process, in a variety of working groups and less-formal methods of sharing expertise and views.
In my experience, an independent agency, such as the FTC, has a sharply limited ability to participate in the Administration's clearance process. On some occasions, a draft document may be shared with the FTC, often early in a policy process, for whatever input the commission may wish to offer. The decision making, however, is done by persons in the executive branch, notably the Executive Office of the President and cabinet agencies such as the Department of Commerce. There are important and long-standing reasons for this separation between independent and executive agencies-the separation avoids the appearance of political pressure on independent agencies. Separation is especially important for enforcement decisions-the FTC has true independence on what enforcement actions it brings, but the corollary is that the FTC is not "inside" the administration when it comes to creating administration policy. A variety of rules exist to limit the interaction of independent agencies and the executive branch; new White House officials, for instance, are briefed by counsel to exercise great caution in their interaction with independent agencies.
As Under the clearance rules, the testimony of both witnesses had to be shared in advance with the other, and the administration had to develop a common position. In my experience, sharing a draft document with an agency with a sharply different perspective is often extremely valuable-assumptions held in the initial agency get challenged, overstatements are modified, and the number of mistakes is reduced. Although I have no direct knowledge of the clearance process in this instance, 3 I think it quite possible that the presence of the Department of Commerce in the process helped create a more nuanced and privacy-protective administration position.
The ability of an independent agency such as the FTC to have a similar role in clearance is sharply limited. Based on my own experience, and on background discussions with people at the FTC, the FTC is not staffed well enough or situated close enough to the "inside" to engage on the day-to-day clearance of documents tions inform international discussions about privacy issues, and there has been international cooperation on enforcement actions. Third, last year the FTC for the first time received full member status in the closed session of data protection authorities at the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners. Executive branch officials continue to attend the closed session, as they have since 1999, but with "observer" status.
These important FTC international activities, however, do not replace the need for the executive branch to have policy capability about privacy. For instance, privacy and e-commerce issues arise in a wide range of bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations-because transborder data flows are such an important part of modern commerce, data-related issues can arise as one piece of many larger trade negotiations, which often involve the International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce. Some multilateral fora persistently address privacy issues, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Organization for International Cooperation and Development. The U.S. delegations for these activities are led by the executive branch, with representation from the Commerce and State Departments.
More generally, the clearance process applies to developing and implementing the position of the United States in international negotiations. The FTC as an independent agency would have no basis for making representations, for instance, about what any executive branch agency would accept, including for law enforcement, homeland security, and non-privacy commercial issues. There is thus a sound basis for the green paper's recommendation that the office "would work in concert with the Executive Office of the President as the Administration's lead on international outreach for commercial data privacy policy. "
Whether privacy policy should be centered in the Commerce Department or the executive office of the president I believe there is an extremely strong case in favor of developing an ongoing privacy policy capability in the executive branch. Privacy policy requires familiarity with a complex set of legal, technological, market, and consumer considerations. Good government thus calls for creating an institutional memory and a group of civil servants experienced in privacy policy. This privacy policy capability goes well beyond the need for federal agencies to comply with the Privacy Act and implement good practices for the personal information they hold.
Where to locate this privacy policy capability is less clear. In a 1998 book, Robert Litan and I discussed the question in detail, and concluded that a privacy policy office should be created in the Department of Commerce.
4 From 1999 until early 2001, by contrast, I served in the role of chief counselor for privacy in the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, and I have written reasons for supporting that approach as well.
The chief advantages and disadvantages are mirror images of each other. Placing the office in the Commerce Department allows for substantially greater staffing, increasing the chance that institutional expertise will accumulate through the ups and downs of public attention to privacy protection. The Commerce Department, however, will be only one of the various agencies that may have views on a particular privacy issue, increasing the risk that privacy will lose out in clearance. On the other hand, placing the policy leadership in OMB or elsewhere in the Executive Office of the President likely improves the possibility of effective coordination of privacy policy across the various agencies. Staffing, however, is always tight at the White House. The chief counselor for privacy, at most, had two full-time staff and one detailee from the Commerce Department.
One model worth considering is the position that Howard Schmidt now fills as cybersecurity coordinator. Mr. Schmidt is part of the national security staff, and also coordinates with the National Economic Council. My understanding is that a significant amount of support for the cybersecurity coordinator is provided by various agencies rather than directly by staff of the Executive Office of the President. A hybrid approach of this sort might achieve more effective privacy policy coordination while also retaining ongoing staffing.
This sort of role might also usefully integrate with the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board, for which President Obama recently nominated James Dempsey and Elizabeth Collins Cook. That board, to be effective, should have professional staff to carry out its task of working on privacy and civil liberties issues that affect anti-terrorist activities. As shown by the example of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, anti-terrorist and law enforcement activities often have intricate interconnections with the commercial actors that own and operate most of the infrastructure for processing personal information. It quite possibly makes sense to permit dual tasking of personnel assigned to the board to work on privacy issues that concern commercial privacy. If this were done, an Executive Office of the President role for a privacy coordinator could be supported both by commercial privacy experts and persons assigned to the oversight board.
In short, various institutional choices might succeed for institutionalizing privacy policy in the executive branch. The privacy policy capability prior to 2009, and it is a good sign that the Department of Commerce green paper is reinvigorating the debate about how best to protect privacy policy while achieving other important goals.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the comments here show important tasks for a Privacy Policy Office in the executive branch, which would complement the FTC's ongoing privacy activities. Notably, such an office would improve interagency clearance, and be important in developing and stating the position of the United States government in international settings. Based on my own discussions with people at the FTC, the FTC does not have the budget or institutional structure to attempt to participate in all of the issues touching on commercial privacy throughout the federal government.
Because these functions complement the existing activities of the FTC, the general effect of such an office would be to improve privacy policy expertise and capabilities, contrary to the concerns expressed by some privacy advocates that such an office would undermine privacy protections. In addition to the advantages described above, executive branch participation in development of industry codes of conduct permits expert input from a range of federal agencies and also brings those agencies up to speed on evolving technology. Another advantage is that an executive branch privacy capability can lend force to privacy legislative or other initiatives-when both the FTC and the administration work together on an issue, the combined effect is likely to be greater than when an independent agency such as the FTC acts alone. Because the administration is likely to be asked to provide its views on important legislation in any event, the existence of an ongoing privacy office in the executive branch will lead to better-informed privacy policy decisions by the administration.
The existence of such an office would also provide a more effective structure for the administration to weigh privacy concerns with other competing policy goals and values. The hope, which I believe is supported by experience, is that participation by privacy experts in executive branch decisions increases the likelihood of winwin situations, in which privacy goals are better achieved and other goals as well.
In short, the Department of Commerce deserves praise for advancing the idea of an ongoing Privacy Policy Office as part of its green paper. 
